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Assessment of decision-making capacity in patients requesting assisted 
suicide 
 
Abstract: In this editorial, we argue that current attitudes towards terminally ill 
patients are generally too paternalistic, and that it is wrong to assume that patients 
suffering from mental health issues (including depression) cannot consent to AS.  
 
Most countries that permit AS do so only for terminally ill patients. In Switzerland, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg however, the law is more permissive: AS 
is permitted independently of life expectancy, which means those patients suffering 
from severe mental illnesses such as treatment-refractory major depressive disorder, 
treatment-resistant chronic schizophrenia, or severe persistent anorexia nervosa can 
also avail themselves of AS (or euthanasia, except in Switzerland). This more liberal 
legislation does, however, require that patients be of sound mind, and have the 
decision-making capacity (DMC) to consent to or request AS.  
 
Four criteria for medical DMC are widely accepted1: (a) the ability to understand the 
relevant information, (b) the ability to appreciate the disorder and the medical 
consequences of the situation, (c) the ability to reason about treatment choices, and 
(d) the ability to communicate a choice.  
The controversy surrounding DMC evaluations in patients seeking AS is due to the 
controversial nature of AS itself. Because it is unusual for doctors to be involved in 
deliberately ending a patients a life, and because of the irreversibility of the decision, 
some believe that a higher standard of competence should be demonstrated in order 
to ascribe DMC to the patient2. Thus, the stringency of DMC requirements should 
increase in proportion to the potential risk to the patient.3 Some critics have even 
suggested that a request for AS is itself suggestive or even indicative of a lack of 
DMC.4 Given these fundamental disagreements, it is hardly surprising that there is 
considerable variation in experts’ opinions regarding proposed threshold of DMC, the 
required time frame to prove that a request for AS is stable and settled, and 
whether/how many different doctors must certify DMC. In a 2000 survey, 58% of 
psychiatrists claimed that major depressive disorder means that a patient is de facto 
incompetent.5 This is unfortunate, as mental illness or cognitive dysfunction do not in 
themselves indicate that a patient lacks DMC.1 Many mental and cognitive conditions 
are compatible with having DMC, and a patient can have depressive disorder without 
lacking DMC. A recent systematic review concluded that depression can influence 
DMC, not that it always does so.6 
 
It appears that the DMC evaluation in AS is often affected by a sort of ethical 
contamination, with relatively simple cases of terminally ill patients requesting AS 
being conflated with more challenging cases of AS requests from patients who are 
not terminally ill; in addition, patients in both these categories may also have a 
psychiatric disease, making four categories in total. It is important to bear in mind 
that all four categories could include both competent and incompetent patients. 
Indeed, one of the reasons why standards are often set so high for those who are 
terminally ill but have no mental health issues is that concerns about DMC and lack 
of terminal illness can contaminate and infect discussions of even ‘simple’ requests 
for AS. One reason for this might be that it is not always obvious which category a 
patient will fall into. 
 
We should prevent incompetent patients from harming themselves; in this case the 
harm would consist in helping them end their lives when they are not fit to make such 
a decision. The principle of respect for autonomy tells us that we should not prevent 
patients who are capable of making autonomous decisions from accessing AS if they 
wish to do so. Similarly, the principle of non-maleficence indicates that we should not 
inflict harm upon competent patients by insisting that they remain alive and suffering. 
More generally, the principle of justice prohibits unfair discrimination, and a DMC 
evaluation that stops competent patients from accessing AS would be unjust. As 
Schuklenk and Van de Vathorst have stated, “Erring on the side of caution… would 
imply also to let a fair number of patients suffer.”7  
 
All of these arguments are particularly applicable to the context of terminally ill 
patients who wish to access AS, for two main reasons. First, their autonomy should 
be respected; most such patients are no more likely to be incompetent than other 
patients of a similar age (in contrast, those who seek suicide in the absence of 
terminal illness raise more concerns regarding autonomy). Second, the potential 
harm of lost time alive to them is less than for patients who are not terminally ill; they 
are relatively close to death and simply want to avoid the potentially immense 
suffering in the last few months of their life. A contrasting argument might be that 
terminally ill patients will not suffer for very long, and that caution is therefore 
justified. However, the counter-objection is that caution is more important in cases 
where the patient is not terminally ill, and the consequent loss of life will be greater. 
In the case of terminally ill patients, they will not lose much life if they are granted AS, 
but they will avoid great suffering. The harms of unjustified AS are also great; 
patients without DMC should not be able to access it, in case their decision would be 
different if they had DMC. But the threshold for justification should not be 
unreasonably high. 
 
One way in which the bar is sometimes set too high for patients who are trying to 
access AS is by broadening the scope of DMC evaluations too far beyond issues of 
DMC. One example of this is using an inappropriately high standard of “stability” of 
attitudes, in line with the criteria of the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences which 
mention that a patient’s wish must persist over time. In principle, a patient can be 
competent and still be ambivalent about a wish. This can result in instable and 
changing requests over time in a competent patient. However, unstable attitudes can 
also be the consequence of fluctuating cognitive and voluntative mental capacities8. 
This shows that it is important to be more specific about DMC evaluations in 
terminally ill patients and to explain in more detail what should be evaluated. 
Otherwise, doctors opposed to AS could insist that a long period of time passes 
before AS can be provided to a terminal patient with early-stage dementia (for 
example). If the period is too long, the patient will either have already died or no 
longer pass a DMC evaluation at the end of it because his or her disease will have 
progressed. Because of these considerations, the degree of required stability should 
be reasonably proportional to the length of time before death, and should take into 
account the previous expressed attitudes of a patient. If someone has always been 
strongly autonomous and previously mentioned the intention to avoid suffering at the 
end of life, there is no reason to wait for another three weeks of stable wishes 
following a request for AS; one week could be enough. But in case where the patient 
had not expressed strong pro-autonomy views or had previously changed his or her 
mind about AS, it would be prudent to re-evaluate stableness more often and for a 
longer period. 
 
Another issue is coercion. To find an example of a case where concerns about 
voluntariness and coercion ‚contaminated’ DMC evaluations, one need look no 
further than Local Authority v Z., where an English welfare authority attempted to 
prevent a woman travelling to Switzerland to seek AS. In this case, she was found 
competent, but it was stated that she might have been found incompetent if she 
could not „assimilate the issues, or fully appreciate the consequences“ or if she was 
„unduly influenced by the views of others or by undue concern for the burden that her 
condition imposed on others“.9 The first quote does concern DMC, but the second 
does not; undue influence concerns coercion, and the ‚burden’ argument also relates 
to questions about voluntariness. It would be a mistake if a patient were diagnosed 
incompetent purely on these latter grounds. Of course, if coercion is indeed present, 
AS should not be provided, but this example illustrates how other “excuses” can 
creep into what should be a narrow evaluation of DMC. 
 
In some cases, of course, concerns about coercion are very closely linked to 
concerns about DMC, and about stability; for example, someone who technically 
meets DMC criteria might nonetheless feel under some pressure because of the 
financial strain he or she is placing on the family; if combined with a relatively 
unstable wish for AS, doctors might be correct to be concerned about DMC, all things 
considered. The interrelatedness of these concepts makes it quite easy for doctors 
opposed to AS to make excuses for not granting requests, and care must be taken to 
keep these concepts separate whenever possible. 
 
Any doctor who attempts to prevent a competent patient from accessing AS is 
adopting an over-paternalistic stance that is contrary to the emphasis on autonomy in 
biomedical ethics more generally. One might never choose AS for oneself, or might 
think that the practice itself is deeply unethical, but to impose those values on one’s 
patients is deeply unethical and unprofessional.  
 
In terms of specific rules, we recommend that physicians should use the approach 
summarised in Table 1. 
 
DMC evaluations in patients requesting AS can be complex, but our analysis shows 
that some doctors may be exaggerating the complexity of it in some cases. For 
patients at the end of life, DMC evaluations should be relatively straightforward, even 
if they have mental health issues. For those who are not yet at the end of life, 
evaluating DMC can be more difficult and a higher standard may be justified, but 
care must be taken to avoid letting other considerations contaminate the DMC 
evaluation. Most importantly, doctors should not let any personal qualms about AS to 
infect the objectivity of DMC evaluation.  
 
Table 1 – Recommendations for assessment of DMC in AS requests 
- DMC should be presumed, except in young children and patients 
suffering from psychiatric diseases to the extent and of a type that 
interferes with DMC 
- General evaluation should look for “red flags” suggesting lack of DMC  
- General evaluation does not need to use systematic evaluation tools or 
instruments, but should document in a narrative way the required 
elements 
- Evaluation (both general and enhanced) should adopt a proportional 
concept of stability of wishes which is derived from the patient’s existing 
and previous attitudes. Therefore, the duration of the necessary “waiting 
period” will vary between patients.  
- Doctors who have deep moral objections to AS should invoke 
conscientious objection and remove themselves from the process rather 
than trying to impose their views on patients. 
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